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Executive Summary
Although the full effects of the Kosovo imbroglio will
not be evident for some time to come and the Amsterdam
Treaty has only just entered into effect, there is
nevertheless a need to focus upon the extent to which the
treaty’s provisions might help the EU and other
associated organisations address future crises
appropriately. The areas in which the Amsterdam
Treaty’s provisions may prove to be inadequate, and
there would appear to be many, also suggest the need to
move beyond the largely paper security structures in
Europe. Kosovo will have one of two effects; either it
will rejuvenate the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and give practical effect to a common defence
policy and common defence, or it will leave the security
of the region largely in the hands of the US with all of
the benefits and risks that this applies. The former will
involve a change in approach to CFSP and a willingness
to invest in appropriate military assets to address the
causes and effects of primarily intra-state conflict. The
latter will continue the patterns established during the
cold war whereby the (west) Europeans rely heavily
upon the US for initiative, leadership, and key military
hardware. Kosovo marks a watershed in the sense that
its effects may well make or break the CFSP.
Kosovo and the challenge to CFSP
The problems facing the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) are part of a wider international challenge
facing all security-oriented organisations. These changes
are best reflected in the fact that in 1991 all the 30 major
conflicts that were being waged were all intra-state
conflicts with the exception of the Gulf War. By 1997
there were 25 major armed conflicts throughout the
world.1 Again, all but one of the conflicts was internal
(the exception being the dispute between India and
Pakistan) and concerned the struggle for control over
the government or the territory of a state and often both.2
Intra-state conflict or “wars of the third kind”3 pose a
fundamental challenge to global security. In designing
responses a delicate balance must be reached between
the primary elements which give the international system
structure, namely sovereignty and statehood, as well as
the moral and legal obligation to observe and uphold
human rights and fundamental dignities. Although the
question of whether to intervene in a nominally sovereign
state on humanitarian grounds is a theme that was not
new with Kosovo, the key issues have been put into
stark relief by events in Kosovo. As Dominique Moisi
observed, Serbia and Kosovo are a “microcosm of our
post-cold war world” and thus “the events taking place
there reflected the changing clout of the various
international actors, the rules of engagement in a global
age, and offer a preview of what modern warfare might
become.”4
With the lessons from Bosnia fresh in mind, the pre-
Amsterdam summit IGC reflected the desire to enhance
CFSP but divisions prevailed and the basic character of
CFSP changed little from the Maastricht Treaty. But
unlike Bosnia, which confronted a number of
organisations (NATO, OSCE and the WEU) with a
crisis while they were in the midst of making the
transition from cold war organisations into effective
post-cold war actors, Kosovo had been a crisis in the
making for a long time. Ironically, the slide to chaos was
aided and abetted by the settlement reached in Bosnia.
Background to the Kosovo Crisis
Kosovo is intimately connected in the Serb mind with
the cradle of Serbian culture and to an immensely long
history of settlement in the minds of the Albanians. The
tales spun around the defeat of Prince Lazar, a legendary
Serb figure, by the Turks at Kosovo Polje in 1389 and
the subsequent five hundred years of Turkish repression
is central to Serb legends. The Albanian claim to Kosovo
is based on their descent from the Illyrians who were
believed to occupy the Balkans before the Romans and
1,000 years prior to the Slavs. The vying histories and
myths have not only fuelled the current crisis but will
also pose a formidable challenge to any post-crisis
settlement.
The first close contacts were established under
Ottoman domination when ethnic Albanians settled en
masse in Kosovo. This coincided with the Serb exodus
which increased after a failed uprising in 1689. The
ethnic Albanians who settled in Kosovo were
distinguished from other Balkan inhabitants due to the
fact that by the 18th century most had converted to
Islam. The success and prominence of the Albanian
inhabitants was thus linked to the process of Islamisation,
as were relations with the Slav neighbours. By the 19th
century however the main distinctions between the
Albanians and Serbs centred on contrasting political
aspiration; the Serbs desired statehood while the
Albanians identified with the Ottoman Empire. In 1878
prominent Albanian leaders established the Albanian
League in Prizren (Kosovo) with the objective of unifying
all Albanian peoples in an autonomous province with in
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the Ottoman Empire.
Kosovo, according to Serb history, was liberatedfrom
Turkish rule in the First Balkan War of 1912. In 1918
Kosovo became part of Yugoslavia if only by virtue of
Serbia’s reconquest of the territory in 1912.
The Serb army (with its Montenegrin ally) then attempted
to consolidate their hold on Kosovo by expelling Turks,
Muslims and Albanians. Following Austria’s insistence,
Serbia and Montenegro surrendered part of their territory
to the new state of Albania. The interwar rivalries were
only a symptom of the deep Serb enmity, as Aleksa
Djilas points out, rooted in “centuries of discrimination
against the Serbian Orthodox Church and oppression of
Serb peasants by Muslim Albanian lords and their
followers.”5
Greater Albania was established in 1941-44 with
Axis support whereby Kosovo was annexed to rump
Albania. Many Albanians gave support to the Axis
forces while most Serbs joined the Chetnik groups.
With the expulsion from Yugoslavia of German forces
at the end of World War II, fighting immediately erupted
between Albanian and Yugoslav forces for the control
of Kosovo. Mass protests followed periodically with
more overt demands for self-rule appearing in 1968 but
it was not until 1974 that the new Yugoslav constitution
granted Kosovo autonomy as a “constituent element of
the federation.” Under Tito, Kosovo officially remained
a province of Serbia. Albanians in Kosovo were however
dissatisfied with being only a “nationality” by which
they were accorded only autonomy and not the status of
a republic within the Yugoslav federation (as say applied
to Croats and Serbs). Tito held together the loose polity
called Yugoslavia but after his death in 1980 students in
Kosovo began to call for independence. Serbs however
also had reason for concern since under Tito around 20
percent of Serbs in Serbia fell outside Belgrade’s
jurisdiction (namely, those living in Kosovo and
Vojvodina). After major Albanian riots martial law was
imposed in 1981. The Albanian Communist Party
branded the rioters counter revolutionaries while the
Serb Communist Party preferred to portray the
insurrection as an ethnic threat.
With Slobodan Miloševic ´’s accession to power in
1987, the deliberate dismantling of the fragile consensual
political structures of the Tito years began. Misha Glenny
noted that under Tito “the system could only function
with two absolute political taboos: overt nationalism
and the active participation of the masses in politics.6
Miloševic ´ was to upset both at the 1987 Central
Committee plenum held, by no coincidence, at Kosovo
Polje.7 A clash of Serb demonstrators with the (largely
Albanian) police outside the plenum led Miloševic ´ to
state that, “No one should beat you.” The Kosovo Serb
leader, Miroslav Soljevic ´ (who was in fact from N s)
observed that “This sentence enthroned him as a Tsar.”8
In March 1989, largely at the behest of the agitated
Serbs in Kosovo, Miloševic ´ established direct rule over
Kosovo and, in the process, stripped the province of its
autonomy. The imposition of martial law resulted in
many Albanians being pushed out of the police, education
and other public positions as a matter of federal policy.
In reaction, Albanian MP’s in the provincial parliament
declared Kosovo to be an independent entity within
Yugoslavia in July 1990. Harassment and discrimination
was mutual between the Kosovo Albanian and Serb
communities and between 1966 and 1989 around
130,000 Serbs left the province.9
The dissolution of the Federal Republic in 1991 with
Croatia and Slovenia’s declarations of independence
led the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) to elect its
own parliament in May 1992 and to establish a Republic
with Ibrahim Rugova as president. “Independence”
however meant the creation by the LDK of a parallel
Albanian government, education and health systems
accompanied by calls for the restoration of Kosovo’s
autonomy. Rugova stressed unprincipled non-violent
resistance in the pursuit of the LDK’s goals. His stance
was not however aimed at establishing a dialogue with
his adversaries but in soliciting the support of NATO for
the plight of the Albanian Kosovars in the hope that this
would lead to military intervention and support for
Kosovo’s independence.
The recognition of rump Yugoslavia by a number of
European countries and the notable omission of Kosovo
from the Badinter Commission’s findings (which
recognised self-determination of federal units but not of
the communities within them), led to the impression that
a double standard was being applied – one for Bosnia
and another for Kosovo. Efforts to monitor concerns
about human rights in Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina
were launched in September 1992 when the OSCE
dispatched three monitoring missions. The monitoring
missions, along with those of the EC, were portrayed as
interference in the internal affairs of the state by Miloševic ´
but accepted by the federal Presidency of Milan Panic ´.
However, Panic’s departure from office concluded the
OSCE presence in June 1993, one month after the first
armed attack against Serb police by the UÇK (Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosoves or Kosovo Liberation Army).10
Rugova insisted that any negotiations on Kosovo’s
future should be carried out on “neutral soil” and in the
presence of international mediators. This had the distinct
attraction from the Kosovo Albanian perspective of
internationalising the dispute while the Serbs saw this as
an unwelcome avenue. However, the patience of some
of the more militant Albanians ran out as a result of the
1995 Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the war in
Bosnia but at cost to Kosovo which was scarcely
mentioned; nor was Miloševic ´ required to address the
deteriorating human rights situation in Kosovo. The
main western actors excluded Kosovo on the grounds
that they wished to “avoid conflict with the Serbian
government, an important player in the signature and
implementation of peace agreements in Bosnia, which
could hamper political and economic reform and the
current process of democratization.”11 Even seasoned
observers, like David Owen, did not apparently think of
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commented after Dayton that “… as 1996 started at least
the wars of 1991-95 were over, and there was a prospect
of peace for the years ahead.”12
In post-Dayton Kosovo Rugova’s support weakened
with the emergence of the anticommunist, Adem Demaçi
of the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and
Freedom and more ominously, the full emergence in
February 1996 of the UÇK as a potentially significant
actor. The UÇK’s funding base improved with a three
percent levy on all earnings abroad which were diverted
to the Homeland Calling Fund.13 However, the number
of Kosovo Albanians working in other parts of Europe
began to decrease post-Dayton as a series of repatriation
agreements were signed between Belgrade and Germany,
Sweden and Switzerland, amongst others. The near
collapse of Albania in 1997 boosted Kosovo’s bid for
independence through more violent means and moved
it further away from Rugova’s nominally peaceable
methods. As Chris Hedges has commented, “A huge
number of disenchanted and angry youth who saw no
benefits from Rugova’s rule and who, unlike their
parents, did not speak Serbo-Croatian, began giving up
on multiethnicity.’14 The UÇK, which had hitherto been
a shadowy and not especially well organised or equipped
organisation, now had the means to provide for an
armed struggle with an estimated 30,000 automatic
weapons finding their way into Kosovo at bargain
prices. On 20 November 1997 Belgrade rejected
demands from France and Germany to negotiate a
special statute for Kosovo. Washington ratcheted up the
pressure on 9 December 1997 to prolong the sanctions
against Yugoslavia by a year. Between February 26 and
1 March 1998 attacks on Serb paramilitary targets saw,
in response, destructive and indiscriminate attacks on
suspected UÇK strongholds in the (central) Drenica
region. By June several thousand refugees had taken to
the hills in search of safety.
The rapidly deteriorating situation in Kosovo
continued to be subordinated to the wider US and EU
objectives in the region that were focussed on ensuring
Miloševic ´’s support for the ouster of the Radovan
Karad ic ´’s hard-line leadership in Republika Srpska. In
return for Miloševic ´’s support a number of diplomatic
concessions were made including the provision for
direct charter flights to the US by Yugoslavia’s national
airline, JAT, and the establishment of a consulate by the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the US. During a visit
to Belgrade in February 1998 the US Special
Representative, Robert Gelbard, pronounced that “[The
UÇK] is without any question a terrorist group. I refuse
to accept any kind of excuses.”16 Having unambiguously
branded the UÇK as “terrorists” (and bearing in mind
the US’s own tough and uncompromising stance on the
issue) the pace of Serb attacks on alleged UÇK
strongholds was stepped up. Both the US and the EU
showed their complete incapacity for any type of conflict
prevention, preferring instead reactive conflict
management as matters deteriorated. The only serious
effort in this regard was the work of the Sant’Egidio
Order to reach an education agreement for a revived
school system that would build confidence in Kosovo.
Two factors eventually prompted a response by the
“west,” led by Richard Holbrooke negotiating on behalf
of the American Secretary of State. First, the ever prying
lenses of the television cameras and photojournalists
transmitted images and reports of the increasingly
desperate conditions facing the Albanian Kosovo
population in the face of increasing Serb strikes against
anything that was allegedly a UÇK target and severe
weather. By March 1998 US Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright, was urging action against the regime
in Belgrade based on concerns about the human rights
situation but also the potential for regional stability.17
Second, Kosovo was not alone in having a sizeable
Albanian majority. The spread of conflict to adjacent
Macedonia, which is around 23 percent Albanian, was
a clear possibility – especially since UNPREDEP’s
mandate was to expire in the not too distant future.18 A
push for a greater Albania could also additionally pull in
other surrounding countries and thus unravel the
precarious peace secured by the Dayton accords.
Diplomatic efforts to resolve the growing crisis
were centred on the reconvened Contact Group that had
addressed the Bosnian crisis. The six-nation (France,
Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US) group
condemned both the “use of excessive force” by the
Serb paramilitary forces as well as “terrorist actions by
the Kosovo Liberation Army.”19 UN Security Resolution
1160 of 31 March 1998 contained much the same
wording but additionally called for a ban on the sale of
all arms and related matériel to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) and threatened
“consideration of further measures” if the resolution
was met with non-compliance.20 The EU (British)
Presidency expressed its “deep concern” at the violent
incidents in Kosovo in early March and called as a
matter of urgency for “the authorities in Belgrade and
the leaders of the Kosovar Albanian community to
resolve the situation peacefully through a full and
constructive dialogue.”21
Security Council Resolution 1160 was reinforced in
September by a further resolution, 1199, which contained
a more specific list of demands. These included the
cessation of all action by the security forces affecting
the civilian population; the withdrawal of security units
used for civilian repression; continuous and effective
international monitoring by the European Community
Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and, in co-operation with
the UNHCR and ICRC, to facilitate the unimpeded
return of refugees and displaced persons.22 Resolution
1199 was followed a day later by the issuance of a
NATO ACTWARN.23 On 24 October Security Council
Resolution 1203 affirmed that “the unresolved situation
in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes
a continuing threat to the peace and security of the
region.” Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
the Security Council demanded that the FRY comply
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resolutions would later form part of the controversial
legal basis for the NATO air strikes against Serb forces
in Kosovo.
In May 1998 the North Atlantic Council described
the situation in Kosovo as “unacceptable.” In June the
foreign ministers of the EU, along with the US, imposed
a ban on new investment in Serbia and froze all Serb
foreign assets. Under international pressure the first
ever Miloševic ´-Rugova meeting was held on 15 May to
discuss the province’s future. By this time however both
parties were locked into a spiral of violence. In July a
Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, under the Contact
Group, the OSCE, and the EU, was given prime
responsibility for monitoring human rights in the
province. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia was also given full authority to investigate
and prosecute violations in Kosovo.
Aside from diplomatic efforts and vague
consideration of “further action,” it is not clear what the
US or its European partners could do at this juncture.
The threat of military action was however indicated on
15 June when NATO mounted a short-notice air exercise,
Determined Falcon.25 William Cohen, US Secretary of
Defense, asserted that this proved that NATO was
“united in its commitment to seek a ceasefire … and
demonstrated its capacity to rapidly mobilise some very
significant lethal capacity.” Seemingly unperturbed by
the pressure, Serb forces launched a series of large
offensives against UÇK strongholds and some 200,000
Albanians were dislodged from villages and towns in
central and south-west Kosovo.27 Further consideration
of military intervention was contentious, at best. Armed
intervention, even for humanitarian goals, ran the risk of
being portrayed as aiding “terrorists” engaged in an
armed struggle within a sovereign state. Russia, as a
member of the Contact Group, was opposed to any
consideration of military intervention from the outset.
Washington was however able to gain sufficient
consensus amongst the NATO allies to threaten
Miloševic ´ with airstrikes in the event of continued non-
compliance with Security Council Resolution 1199.
Privately, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain
all expressed reservations about whether the resolutions
constituted a legal mandate for airstrikes. Unity amongst
the NATO allies was therefore built around the
expectation that Miloševic ´ would back down and that
the use of force would not be necessary.
On 14 October Miloševic ´, under the threat of
imminent NATO air strikes, agreed to a settlement with
Holbrooke. The number of Serb troops and “police”
would be reduced to a specified level and the OSCE
would provide 2,000 unarmed personnel to verify
compliance with the terms of the agreement. The threat
of air strikes was only alleviated on 27 October after the
Serb forces were reduced to a broadly acceptable level
(although behind schedule).28 During the eight months
between the beginning of the Serb offensive and the
Holbrooke-Miloševic ´ agreement, some 750 Kosovo
Albanians died and around 250,000 were left homeless.
As the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission assumed its
duties a NATO extraction force arrived in Macedonia
with a mandate to protect the OSCE mission should it be
threatened and, if need be, to provide safe armed escort
for the verifiers out of Kosovo.
In the interim between the October 1998 agreement
and the two sets of negotiations at Rambouillet
commencing in February 1999, the US Ambassador to
Macedonia Christopher Hill, unsuccessfully attempted
to negotiate a settlement between the Kosovo Albanians
and Belgrade. Holbrooke, having threatened NATO
airstrikes in October 1998, forewarned of their use
again in the event of no agreement. Miloševic ´ decided
to resist the threat however and refused the Rambouillet
terms. NATO, now forced to make good on its often-
postponed threats, began its first air strikes on 24 March.
For NATO members the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo
had become a matter of the credibility of the Alliance.
In an indirect manner, since most NATO members are
EU members, the fate of Kosovo was also linked to the
future of CFSP. A hugely successful outcome, which
seems unlikely, will dampen any need for the
strengthening or reform of the second pillar. An
unsuccessful or ambiguous outcome (which seems most
likely) might create pressure for reform of the CFSP in
order to align the EU’s economic importance and
influence with that in regional security and defence. It
may, alternatively, condemn it to insignificance.
Implications for the CFSP
There are some parallels between the situation that
prevailed in Bosnia from 1991 onwards and with those
in Kosovo. In the first parallel, diplomacy was deemed
to have been largely unsuccessful unless backed by
military assets and this dramatically reduced the
effectiveness of the EU member states bargaining power.
Moreover, in both cases the US was the only power who
had the panoply of diplomatic tools to make a real
difference. In both instances those responding to the
crisis were highly risk adverse which led to heavy
reliance on air strikes as a means of bringing the parties
to (or back to) the negotiating table. Both crises also
threatened to ignite a wider regional struggle. The two
crises are also linked, by default, in the failure of the
1995 Dayton Accords to make any provision for Kosovo
which, in turn, opened the door for the armed struggle
that followed.
As in Bosnia, the role of the EU in the Kosovo crisis
was rather minor. A Community Monitoring Mission
was established (ECMM), which is currently under
Ambassador Horst Holtoff, and Wolfgang Petritsch was
appointed EU Special Envoy. Additionally, since 1996
twenty-two declarations, decisions or Joint Actions
have been passed within the CFSP framework relating
to Kosovo. The EU took an early lead in applying
economic sanctions against Serb assets overseas as well
as inbound investment. An embargo on the export of
arms to the former Yugoslavia was confirmed on 19
March 1998 as was the moratorium on government-6 Eipascope 99/2
financed export credit support for trade and investment
in Serbia.29 The EU has, on a number of occasions, made
clear its terms and conditions for the resumption of
normal economic and political relations between
Belgrade and the EU capitals.30 In October, the EU
adopted a “comprehensive approach” to Kosovo in
which the EU pledged its full support for the OSCE and
the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and offered,
amongst other things, to increase the ECMM
contributions to the KVM. In spite of this however it
was clear that the EU’s envisaged role was conflict
prevention since confidence building, civil society
building, and community support for the Education
Agreement were specifically mentioned.31 The EU
additionally called upon the WEU’s Satellite Centre at
Torrejon, Spain, to “provide relevant information.”32
In spite of the fact that the EU Heads of State and
Government stressed “the necessity of an active role for
the European Union in overcoming the crisis” the
envisaged role appears to emphasise post-conflict
settlement.33 More specifically the EU leaders agreed
upon the main elements of an interim arrangement for
Kosovo, to be established directly after the end of
conflict. This would include:
– The establishment of an international interim
administration which the EU could take over;
– The creation of a police force that reflects the
composition of the population of Kosovo;
– The holding of free and fair elections;
– And deployment of international military forces that
will guarantee protection for the whole population
of Kosovo.
In addition the EU announced EUR 250 million of
additional aid for direct humanitarian support and offset
support for those hosting the refugees.34 The post-
conflict agenda appears to build upon the EU-WEU
experience in Bosnia and co-ordination between the
two will be assisted by the same country holding
simultaneously the Presidencies of the EU and the WEU
for the first six months of every year. No matter how
well equipped the EU may be to assume the tasks
outlined, the fundamental questions remain of how one
gets to the post-conflict stage and whether the EU is
equipped to assist in this regard?
It is difficult to ascertain what impact, if any, the EU
had or might yet have in the Kosovo crisis. The emerging
Anglo-French leadership in European defence may
warrant grounds for cautious optimism as might the
modest contributions to Operation Allied Force by
Germany.35 It is however painfully apparent that it is
completely beyond the EU’s capabilities to mount
military operations of the size and nature witnessed
from March onwards without substantial US assistance.
Arguably, Washington’s political leadership may have
enhanced the image of EU coherence (or at least the
European members of NATO) when in fact a good deal
less would have been realised if the European allies had
been left to their own devices. Jörg Monar noted that the
difficulties associated with getting fifteen members to
arrive “at substantial and timely decisions within the
intergovernmental framework of the “old” Title V of the
[Maastricht Treaty] have been notorious.”36 Even
relatively minor issues, such as the debate about whether
to deny JAT landing rights, became immensely
controversial.
On 15-16 June 1998, the EU at the Cardiff Summit
took an agreement in principle, to ban all flights from
and to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Subsequently
a common position on this was adopted at a General
Affairs Council meeting on 29 June. The agreed
procedures were not however enforced until 7 September
due to political resistance from Greece (with its pro-
Yugoslav sympathies) and Britain (who claimed legal
complications). The latter in particular came under
severe fire for claiming that it was obliged to give a
year’s notice under the terms and conditions of the
existing bilateral agreement. The JAT dispute illustrates
not only the difficulties of reaching consensus but in
implementing positions once adopted.
The difficulties associated with agreeing upon a
course of action amongst the fifteen EU members are
well known. Although the Amsterdam Treaty was not in
force at the commencement of Operation Allied Force,
it is worth pondering whether the modifications to the
CFSP introduced by the treaty will improve the EU’s
effectiveness in Kosovo-type scenarios.
Enhancing decision making?
In spite of the emphasis in the Amsterdam Treaty upon
the security of the Union (as opposed to its Member
States), the essential tools for accomplishing this remains
resolutely intergovernmental. The possibility of one
Member State effectively blocking the CFSP had been
recognised by the 1996 IGC. Thus, the introduction of
modified voting rules and the so-called “constructive
abstention” practice was designed to stop such logjams.37
Under the new procedures any member of the Council
may qualify its abstention with a formal declaration.
They shall then be obliged to refrain from any action
likely to conflict with that of the Union and to respect the
Union’s position.
The abstention mechanism may seem like a welcome
development especially given the known differences on
defence questions within the Union held by, for example,
the neutral or non-aligned members (Austria, Finland,
Ireland and Sweden) or the special position of Denmark
on defence issues. There are however potential pitfalls.
For example, the mechanism for abstention, which
involves a formal declaration, poses an awkward
dilemma for those who may wish to support a given
initiative in the face of declared objections. Abstention
also makes a mockery of the “spirit of loyalty and
mutual solidarity” which is supposed to pervade CFSP.38
Abstention may also provide a conduit for avoidance of
financial obligations.
The question of qualified majority voting (QMV)
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IGC since it went right to the question of how
supranational or intergovernmental the CFSP should
be. The existing stipulations on QMV, laid out in Article
J.13 of the Maastricht Treaty, left it to the Council
“when adopting a joint action and at any stage in its
development” to define “those matters on which
decisions are to be taken by qualified majority vote.”
The Amsterdam treaty generally upholds the unanimity
principle but specifies that the Council shall act by
QMV when:
– Adopting joint actions, common positions or taking
any other decisions on the basis of a common
strategy;
– Adopting any decision implementing a joint action
or a common position;
– QMV shall not apply to decisions having military or
defence implications.
However, if a member declares that “for important
and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to
oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified
majority,” a vote shall not be taken.39 The Council may,
in this event, decide (by qualified majority) that the
matter be referred to the European Council who shall
decide on the matter unanimously, thus negating much
of the point of the modification.
The reference to common strategy was a further
innovation of the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 13(2)
gives the European Council the power to decide on
common strategies that set out the “objectives, duration
and the means to be made available by the Union and the
Member States.” The introduction of common strategies
in the Amsterdam Treaty appears to largely replace
what had hitherto been joint actions under the Maastricht
proceedings. Since common strategies are apparently
so comprehensive in their scope, there is apparently
little left to be voted upon.40
Overall, the decision-making mechanisms
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty goes some way
towards the development of majority-based decisions
for the first time in the CFSP. Yet the abstention
mechanism also strengthens the hand of those exercising
the option and might even encourage national-interest
driven foreign and security policy as opposed to the
“mutual solidarity” sought by the treaty. In practice it
seems unlikely that there will not be at least one EU
member with a vested or particular interest at stake (as
in Greece’s case with Kosovo).
Aside from decision-making modifications, the
Amsterdam Treaty also saw the introduction of a number
of new institutional structures which could perhaps help
with future crises. The suggested structures are however
modest and it is unclear whether they will significantly
alter the ability of the CFSP to address Kosovo-type
crises (and these, it has been argued, promise to be the
norm rather than the exception).
Structures to cope with future crises
The crisis in Kosovo emphasised the role of Javier
Solana, NATO’s Secretary General, as well as that of
SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, while Kofi Anan is
the well-known face of the UN. Except for those who
follow security events with reasonable attention, the
WEU Secretary-General, José Cutileiro, may be less
familiar. But who is the public face of CFSP? Kissinger’s
famous rhetorical question of to whom he should call
when he wanted to talk to Europe, led to President
Chirac’s August 1995 advocacy of the need for a
Secretary-General (soon dubbed Monsieur PESC after
the French abbreviation for CFSP) with broad
representational and implementing tasks. This was soon
watered down, mainly by Britain. What eventually
emerged in the Amsterdam Treaty was the new post of
High Representative.41
i) The High Representative: CFSP’s face?
Although the identity of the appointee and the precise
functions of the office have yet to emerge with clarity,
it nevertheless marks a significant step forward from the
prevailing system of trying to make foreign policy by
monthly meetings of the national foreign policy
personnel.42 However, the High Representative will
clearly not be a European Minister of Foreign Affairs
and it seems most unlikely, given the disparate
approaches to foreign and security policy amongst the
fifteen members, that any such office will be created in
the near future. The relationship between the High
Representative and the Presidency is also ambiguous.
The High Representative, who is also the Secretary-
General of the Council, shall “assist” the Presidency “in
particular through contributing to the formulation,
preparation and implementation of policy decisions,
and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the
Council at the request of the Presidency, through
conducting political dialogue with third parties.”43 But,
the Presidency “represents” the Union in matters
concerning the CFSP, and the Presidency is responsible
for the implementation of decisions taken under the
CFSP. Much will therefore depend upon how the rotating
Presidency interprets the extent of the High
Representative’s ability to “assist.”
It is difficult to imagine the High Representative
having significant sway in one of the Presidencies of the
major members or amongst one of the neutral or non-
aligned members (or Denmark) where special
considerations apply. There is the potential nevertheless
for the High Representative to make a very valuable
contribution by providing some continuity to the CFSP
and, through the Policy Planning and Early Warning
Unit (PPEWU), which shall reside under the High
Representative, to make a contribution to a more pro-
active CFSP.
In light of the Bosnian and Kosovo crises, there are
two arguments in favour of the High Representative
assuming a fairly broad role with appropriate powers of
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Presidency suffers from the inevitable problem of
inconsistency based upon the office’s rotation every six
months (even the Troika mechanism does not overcome
this). The High Representative, if appointed for a
reasonable period of time, would at least offer the
advantage of permitting initiatives to be seen through
and allow third party actors to identify with the key
CFSP actors for longer than a six month period. Second,
the current system of making foreign policy at monthly
meetings inevitably makes for a reactive agenda. The
constant presence of a High Representative, backed by
the PPEWU, could make for a more proactive CFSP.
There is the risk though that the High Representative’s
attempts make a coherent position out of the fractious
contributions by the Member States might make for an
embarrassing lowest common denominator that says
more about the EU’s lack of a single voice in CFSP
issues than its strengths. It is also unclear whether
Washington would prefer to address a High
Representative representing the EU when their traditional
approach has relied heavily upon individual contacts.
ii) The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit –
from reactive to proactive CFSP?
The need for greater long-term strategies was one of the
few points of agreement in the 1996 IGC. Accordingly
the outline for a Policy Planning and Early Warning
Unit (PPEWU) was included in a declaration attached to
the Final Act.44 The unit is to be comprised of personnel
drawn from the General Secretariat, the Member States,
the Commission and the WEU. The responsibilities of
the new unit should include:
– Monitoring and analysing developments in areas
relevant to the CFSP;
– Providing assessment of the Union’s foreign and
security policy interests and identifying areas where
the CFSP should focus in future;
– Providing timely assessments and early warning of
events or situations which may have significant
repercussions for the Union’s CFSP, including
potential political crises; and
– Producing, at the request of either the Council or the
Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy
papers to be presented under the responsibility of the
Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in
the Council, and which may contain analyses,
recommendations and strategies for the CFSP.
The precise composition of the unit remains unclear
following the rejection of the proposals forwarded by
Jürgen Trumpf, Secretary General of the Council of
Ministers. According to one report, “Paris wanted the
unit to go considerably further than Trumpf’s paper
indicated, while other countries claimed it went too
far.”45 Most members would prefer that the PPEWU be
a separate unit within the Directorate-General of the
Council Secretariat responsible for external relations
(thus separate but integrated within the Directorate-
General). A minority though, alongside the Commission,
would prefer the PPEWU to be autonomous within the
General Secretariat, under the direct line and
management of the High Representative.46 Although
the respective powers of the High Representative, the
PPEWU, the Council and the Presidency are all defined
in the Amsterdam Treaty, the relations between the
constituents remain unclear. The advent of the High
Representative and PPEWU could significantly enhance
the CFSP’s conflict prevention abilities. Parties are
more likely to listen to an appointed representative of
the EU who is in office for more than six months. The
PPEWU, although it promises to be small, is similarly
important since conflict prevention rests upon the ability
to identify potential trouble sports before they erupt.
The PPEWU could also work closely with monitoring
missions which in the past have proved their value in a
quiet manner. For instance, the Bosnia ECMM was
highly responsive to suggestions from policy makers
regarding on the ground feasibility of various options.
In conjunction with other observer missions, such as
those mounted by the OSCE or the UN, early warning
and prevention missions, if appropriately structured,
“may go a long way towards overcoming the natural
inertia of the international system in responding to
incipient violent conflict.”47 An effective High
Representative would hopefully exploit not only the
treaty-based enhancements but also other solutions and
mechanisms such a monitoring missions.
The above provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty,
alongside the revised budgeting rules, represent slight
modifications to the Maastricht Treaty in the CFSP area.
The effectiveness of these modifications depends very
much upon the willingness of the Member States to use
the new structures and machinery. However, with
Kosovo in mind, those issues relating to the development
of the CFSP’s defence aspects continue to represent the
weakest area of the CFSP and one in which the EU
remains largely reliant on its transatlantic partner. If
anything, the Amsterdam Treaty has reinforced this
tendency.
Providing for Europe’s military requirements: is
there a need for an autonomous capability?
The crisis in Kosovo demonstrated that Miloševic ´
understands the language of diplomacy backed by force.
Pre-Amsterdam CFSP certainly lacked the structures
and the will to combine diplomacy with the threat or use
of credible force. One of the most contentious areas in
the EU’s 1996 IGC was the issue of the extent to which
military means (through the WEU and indirectly NATO)
should be fully integrated into the second pillar. The
Benelux countries, France, Germany, Italy and Spain
were broadly in favour of the WEU’s full integration
into the EU. Others, most notably Britain, remained
staunchly opposed on the grounds that this might dilute
the role of NATO while the neutral and non-aligned
countries based their opposition on obvious political
and constitutional objections. Although there was some
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EU, the overarching question of whether the EU members
are willing and able to provide for their own security and
defence remained unanswered.
The Amsterdam Treaty continues to reflect the
traditional Atlanticist versus Europeanist strains dating
back to the ill-fated European Defence Community of
the 1950s. Article 17(1) of the treaty states that the WEU
is an “integral part of the development of the Union
providing the Union with access to an operational
capability notably in the context of paragraph 2.” The
paragraph referred to shall include “humanitarian and
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” –
these are often called Petersberg Tasks after the WEU
Council’s 1992 meeting. The terms “peacekeeping”
and “peacemaking” are however subject to many
different interpretations and there is no guidance in the
treaty, or associated declarations, as to their substance.
This may give rise to some important issues, such as
whether this includes or excludes “peace enforcement”
or other more heavily armed forms of peacekeeping.48
The paragraph also formed the basis for an informal
division of military tasks between the WEU, with prime
responsibility for Petersberg-type tasks, and NATO
handling the more muscular aspects such as peace
enforcement.
Since the WEU’s acquis was not fully integrated
into the EU, a number of potentially divisive questions
remain regarding the implementation of the Petersberg
Tasks. Under the Amsterdam Treaty “all Member States
of the Union shall be entitled” to participate in Petersberg
Tasks. The Council, in agreement with the WEU, shall
adopt “the necessary practical arrangements to allow all
Member States contributing to the tasks in question to
participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and
decision-making in the WEU.” There are, for a start,
only ten WEU members while there are fifteen EU
members. The five who remain outside the WEU
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) would
presumably not cause any significant problems as long
as the operations were clearly presented under the
Petersberg banner. It is however worth noting that the
WEU, in spite of the Petersberg Tasks, is by treaty a
collective defence organisation. More stubborn problems
are likely to be encountered if “members” means not
only full members but all forms of WEU membership.
If for instance Associate Members are entitled to
“participate fully and on an equal footing” then the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Portugal
and Turkey have the right to do so. The failure of the
IGC to fully integrate the WEU into the EU also opens
up a number of other problems such as how the WEU
will modify its internal procedures. There are also
confidentiality and security issues to be considered.
Furthermore, since the WEU remains an autonomous
organisation and it is therefore not reliant upon the
CFSP for a mandate to act, there may well be arguments
for maintaining the status quo.
The WEU assumed added importance in the
Amsterdam Treaty since reference was made to the
WEU’s ability to provide the EU with access to an
“operational capability.” It was recognised in the interim
between the 1991 and 1996 IGCs that there were certain
situations where the US would simply not wish to
participate in military operations.50 The North Atlantic
Council developed a design for a nominally Europe-
only capability at meetings in Brussels and Berlin in
1994 and 1996 respectively. The provision of “separable
but not separate” forces was designed to allow the EU to
“avail itself” of the WEU which, under the Amsterdam
Treaty, was thus endowed with access to an operational
capability. The “operational capability” though rests
upon the release of NATO assets to the WEU. However,
there are few NATO assets per se and they include only
a number of commands, communications facilities, and
AWACS aircraft – accounting only for around 13,000
personnel. Paradoxically, at the heart of the “Europe
only” options the WEU would be reliant upon the US for
the provision of certain key assets, such as real-time
intelligence, electronic jamming or heavy airlift, to
mount a “Europe-only” operation.51
The WEU, by itself, remains inadequate as a serious
military organisation capable of addressing all but the
smallest crises. Even the relatively small crisis such as
that in 1997 in Albania following the collapse of a
government-backed pyramid investment scheme, which
in many ways was tailor made to demonstrate the
WEU’s new-found political and military capabilities,
was a missed opportunity. There have been attempts to
develop indigenous European crisis management
capabilities, collectively termed Forces Answerable to
the WEU (FAWEU), but most of these are “earmarked”
military forces that have not actually trained together
other than in a limited number of crisis management
exercises (CRISEX). The Strasbourg-based Eurocorps
is perhaps the notable exception but even here questions
have to be raised about the command, intelligence and
logistical resources.
In spite of the advances made in the Amsterdam
Treaty in defence, the EU fails to be a serious security
or defence actor. It is all too apparent that responsibilities
in these areas are assumed by NATO and, within the
Alliance, by the US. To some, what emerged from the
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties is nothing less than
a political construct that actually, through its vague
provisions, merely serves the political expediency of
the major players and does nothing to actually create a
workable European Security and Defence Identity. Philip
Gordon dubbed this the “convenient myth” of European
security:
France needs to claim a greater role for Europe as
political cover to come back into the Alliance;
Germany needs to show progress toward European
political unification to reassure its elites and to
convince its public to accept monetary union; Britain
wants to show a strong role for the WEU to forestall
calls to give the EU a defense role; and the U.S.10 Eipascope 99/2
administration needs to be able to claim to Congress
and the public that the Europeans are now prepared
to shoulder more of the defence burden of
transatlantic defense.52
Political expediency does not necessarily make for
military solutions. Kosovo has made it all too evident
that the European Emperor has very few clothes.
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it?
To some, the logical conclusions from Bosnia and
perhaps in time to come Kosovo, might be “if it ain’t
broke, don’t fix it.” After all, if there is broad recognition
of common transatlantic interests and especially those
of the US in Europe’s security, continued reliance upon
US diplomatic and military backing for Kosovo-type
scenarios might seem to be the logical course. However,
this assumes continued convergence between EU
interests and those of the US. It also assumes that the
goal of European integration should remain essentially
incomplete without one of its (if not the) main
components. Neither assumption is wholly sustainable.
EU interests have diverged from those of the US on
a number of different issues, ranging from specific trade
issues to the efficacy of sanctions. There have also been
a number of significant differences over the use of
military force in Iraq and Libya (where Britain was the
only notable backer), the arms embargo in Bosnia, and
the use of prolonged air strikes in relation to Kosovo. It
should also be noted that the EU’s reliance upon the US
for initiative condemns the EU to crisis management,
which it has been argued, is an area of weakness for the
CFSP. In both Bosnia and Kosovo US intervention
came late and, once there, it has swamped all other
efforts. Moreover, it is unreasonable to expect the US to
see a vital national interest wherever an EU member
state happens to see one. Interests have diverged and
will continue to do so in the future although there will be
common ties as well. Transatlantic relations may also be
compounded by the EU’s frustration at having to stand
on the sidelines “allowing the United States to take
priority in what is the European security space.”53
Throughout the history of European Political Co-
operation and its successor, CFSP, there has been implicit
and occasionally explicit recognition that European
integration will remain incomplete without a security
and defence angle. The “Vienna Strategy for Europe,”
approved by the Council in December 1998, recognised
that there is a need to restore the equilibrium to the
development of the EU as an economic entity and the
Union as a political entity.54 Germany, currently holding
the EU Presidency, has promised a report to be presented
at the Cologne summit on 3-4 June on paths towards a
common defence policy. An increased emphasis on the
international dimensions of the EU’s activities, including
CFSP, will not only give much needed balance to its
persona but also benefit the Union more generally since
the economic aspects of its activities often cannot be
separated from the political or security ramifications.
There is an additional reason to question the
desirability of the status quo. The undoubted military
superiority of the US, which serves to emphasise the
inadequate nature of most of the EU members” military
establishments, has distracted attention from the
questionable results of US leadership. Military prowess
and the willingness to use it is only useful if it makes a
positive contribution to regional or international stability.
In this regard the US record is mixed: Haiti remains in
a terrible state, Somalia is still crippled by factions and
Iraq as belligerent and resistant as ever. Other trouble
spots, such as the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Liberia
or Sierra Leone, did not merit decisive US attention.
Perhaps the uneasy peace in Bosnia is an exception.
Kosovo remains in the balance.
The issue of leadership is not merely one that applies
to the US administration but also to the American public
and whether they are willing to enable their leaders to
defend principles and its self-proclaimed status as
“greatest nation on earth.”55 Although there are other
hesitant allies in NATO, the preponderance of US force
in operations in Kosovo and Yugoslavia means that the
American perspective is more important than the rest.
This may well prove to be an inadequate way of securing
Europe’s future stability for two related reasons.
First, reliance upon the US and NATO may well
condemn the EU to further crisis management and not
move the emphasis to crisis prevention, for which the
EU is better suited. Crisis management will continue to
play to US diplomacy and military strength while crisis
prevention would capitalise on the EU’s greatest asset,
which is the promise of future membership or association.
Diplomacy and mediation by the EU member states is
further hampered by the fact that the US is, as obvious
as it sounds, the US, complete with all of its historical
baggage, national pride and even superiority. The US,
in some cases, may not be the best country to head
delicate mediatory efforts.
Second, the US is not a good team player. It is a
leader. Substantial differences in approach to
fundamental issues in European security between the
US and the EU (more often than not with Britain siding
with the US) cast into doubt the extent to which Alliance
aims are really shared. US leadership and forceful
diplomacy does have the benefit of engaging at least the
key European players but often at the cost of alienating
some smaller and potentially important partners. NATO
should not be a vehicle for US diplomacy and national
interests but should reflect the interests of the nineteen
members. However, not all NATO members are EU
members and, since NATO’s recent expansion, the
discrepancy of six members between NATO and the EU
have become more noticeable and problematic, as indeed
has the difference of five members between the EU and
WEU. The damaged credibility of NATO and in
particular the lack of resolve and will amongst its
members to match aims with risks, should at least dispel
the impression that NATO is a panacea for the EU’s
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Although not all challenges will demand a military
response, some will. Kosovo has also illustrated that
effective diplomacy will sometimes rely on the backing
of a visible and effective deterrent. The need for an
autonomous European common defence policy and
capability has become apparent, first with the crisis in
Bosnia, next in Albania and now in Kosovo. Even arch
Atlanticists, like Britain, would appear to be shifting
towards this realisation.
A Sea Change in Europe’s defence and security?
There have been suggestions in the press that the
beginning of a fundamental shift in European defence is
underway and the Kosovo crisis may well increase the
momentum for change.56 The key evidence for this is
that Britain, a staunch supporter of NATO and the
transatlantic component of CFSP, has modified its
position on European defence in what could amount to
a sea change. The public unveiling of Britain’s initiative
on European defence was made at the EU Pörtschach
summit on 24-25 October 1998, held under the auspices
of the Austrian Presidency. In an interview prior to the
summit Blair made it clear that Britain was willing to
drop its longstanding objection to the EU having a
defence capability but that he was not talking of a
European army. He also noted that, “Nothing must
happen that in any way impinges on the effectiveness of
NATO.”57 The Pörtschach summit, ostensibly called to
discuss “real problems,” included Blair’s outline of a
number of defence “options” for the EU:58
– The strengthening of the European security and
defence identity within NATO;
– The dissolution of the WEU and its integration into
the EU; and
– The establishment of modern and flexible European
forces.
Although Blair’s outline lacked details it marked a
significant reversal from Britain’s traditional resistance
to EU responsibility in security and defence affairs. Not
long after, the Austrian Defence Minister, Werner
Fasslabend, called an informal summit of the fifteen EU
defence ministers on 4 November 1998 in Vienna to
discuss prospects for European defence after the entry
into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. At the summit
George Robertson, the British Defence Secretary, noted
that Europe had reached a “defining moment” for defence
policy and that Bosnia and Kosovo had raised the
question of “when we press the button for action, is it
connected to a system and a capability that can deliver?59
He emphasised the need for “armed forces that are
deployable and sustainable, that are modern, powerful
and flexible, that are mobile, survivable and are highly
capable.” The institutional options were not “about
removing defence from the control of national
governments,” or about creating a “standing European
army,” nor should they undermine or duplicate NATO.60
However, the question of the merger of the WEU into
the EU raised, according to Robertson, “a number of
difficulties.” His preferred solution was to explore other
options such as “merging some elements of the WEU
into the EU and associating other elements more closely
with NATO, or perhaps creating a more distinct European
dimension within NATO.”61
As a result of a subsequent meeting between President
Chirac and Prime Minister Blair in St.Malo, a joint
Franco-British declaration was issued on European
defence.62 The declaration called for the Amsterdam
Treaty to be made “a reality” which, amongst other
factors, would involve endowing the Union with “the
capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible
military forces, the means to decide to use them and a
readiness to do so.”63 The declaration’s main impact
was to call for a far more autonomous European military
capability than had hitherto been enunciated:
In order for the European Union to take decisions
and approve military action where the Alliance as a
whole is not engaged, the Union must be given
appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of
situations, sources of intelligence and a capability
for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary
duplication, taking account of the existing assets of
the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the
EU. In this regard, the European Union will also
need to have recourse to suitable military means
(European capabilities pre-designated within
NATO’s European pillar or multinational European
means outside the NATO framework).64
The St.Malo declaration received much positive
comment but there remains a compelling need to absorb
the lessons of Kosovo in order to give substance to the
declaration. Indeed, the self-congratulatory mood of the
EU as it ushered in Monetary Union on 1 January 1999
stood in marked contrast to its weakness to decisively
influence events in Kosovo.
It is though possible that the EU’s relative impotence
in Kosovo may lead to action to create a meaningful and
operative CFSP. Indeed, several calls along these lines
have already been made such as Emma Bonino’s
suggestion that the European Council could provide a
mandate to the newly appointed Monsieur (or Madame)
PESC and to the president of the European Commission
to oversee a replay of the Delors committee on Emu. A
similar idea was expressed by Romano Prodi, the
incoming President of the Commission, in a speech to
the European Parliament on 4 May when he spoke of the
new design for the institutions which will be needed to
“exploit to the full concerted efforts in the field of
defence, possibly based on the gradual and progressive
model which has already been used for monetary union.
A common defence of the European Union will be a
basic condition for maintaining peace and stability …
Europe must be able to do is share.”65 Prodi saw it as a
“logical next step” in creating a common defence policy
for the EU after the merging of national defence
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Union “marginalised in the new world history.”66
The degree of autonomy that is desirable from
existing structures for any enhancement of the CFSP,
including the defence dimensions, has to be addressed
on two levels. The first is the political level where
fundamental national differences of outlook should be
addressed, as should transatlantic differences (France
bears special responsibility in this regard). The best
designs in the world will not work unless there is a
European identity in security and defence matters where
challenges and responses are seen as a matter of common
concern and not of selective interest. Perhaps the inability
of the EU, or even the European Security and Defence
Identity within NATO, to decisively influence the
passage of events in Kosovo will shame the EU into
such common purpose.
The second level is the more practical. The St.Malo
declaration is clear about the dangers of duplication and
any modifications should ensure that the organisations
have guaranteed access to assets as may be required.
The question of how significant or hypothetical the
US’s “physical veto” (through denial of access to key
assets that the EU members do not possess) is must
therefore be faced head on. It is difficult to believe that
the US would assume the expense of research and
development of weapons systems only to guarantee its
European allies automatic access. If there is the possibility
of veto or at least political rancour from Congress, the
development or acquisition of the requisite systems for
European usage makes increasing sense.
In this regard the British proposals for a new fourth
pillar, dedicated to defence, have some attraction since
it is defence, as opposed to the more general foreign or
security aspects of the CFSP, that has generated most
disagreement within the Community and now Union.
Much will depend on how “defence” and “security” are
defined since defence, of the cold war variant, is of
questionable relevance in a Union where none are
seriously challenged by external aggression. Perhaps a
constructive was of thinking about a restructured pillar
design is for the second pillar to be accorded prime
responsibility for the less controversial conflict
prevention and traditional peacekeeping aspects. The
new fourth pillar, incorporating the WEU with Article
V of the Modified Brussels Treaty, would be dedicated
to conflict management including peace-enforcement
(with NATO’s active involvement).
Prodi’s observation that a merger of European
defence industries is an essential underpinning for an
effective CFSP is valid but one that carries dangers. The
failure of the Horizon frigate project after three years of
negotiations provides a pessimistic portent of things to
come, especially since this follows hot on the heels of
the controversial acquisition by BAe of GEC’s Marconi
defence interests which allegedly set back the prospects
for a European Aerospace Industry. The EU is therefore
faced with two choices: either seek economies of scale
through co-development within Europe or through
transatlantic fora or; second, rely increasingly on the US
for the next generation of hi-tech weapons.67
Both courses have their dangers. The development
of a European armaments industry may further decrease
the US’s willingness to involve itself in European
security interests that are difficult to defend at home.
The antagonistic atmosphere that exists in certain areas
of US-EU trade would be carried directly into security
and defence relations if the impression is given that
America’s European allies are only willing to buy
home-developed armaments and thus exclude the highly
efficient and competitive US manufacturers. Second,
reliance upon the US’s current technological lead in
advanced weaponry tends to exaggerate the utility and
effectiveness of high-tech weapons as well as
underestimate the technological sophistication of the
European defence industries. Technology is only useful
when applied to a specific application. Much of the
vaunted technological lead of the US stems from the
development of last-generation cold war systems. How
necessary or relevant are B-2 bombers or the F-117
“Stealth” fighters for intra-state conflicts and conflict
prevention?
A good starting point would be the loosening and
ideally severing of government control over defence
industries in the EU countries. The prospect of a merger
between the guided missile divisions of BAe, Lagardère
and Finmeccanica, would do much to restore optimism
that a European defence industry might one day emerge.
The importance attached to the potential for a European
defence industry should not be underestimated since, as
EMU showed us, commitment tends to follow the purse.
NATO’s failure in Kosovo?
The historical debates about whether or not to create a
European security and defence entity were framed in the
knowledge that, whatever their outcome, NATO
(especially the US) would provide for their essential
security. The cold war debates on European security
and defences were therefore somewhat academic. They
also supposed that NATO was the superior Alliance
and, at the end of the cold war, the victorious alliance.
It was also untested.
With the launch of Operation Allied Force Kosovo
became a symbol for the struggle between realism and
morality.68 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo has the
potential to redefine many aspects of our current
understanding of sovereignty, statehood, war (the word
though is studiously avoided in connection with Kosovo)
and peacekeeping in all of its manifestations. But, as
Daniel Goldhagen observed, all of these principles
come secondary to a fundamental one, “the right not to
be murdered.”69 Somewhere along the line the airstrikes
lost sight of this fundamental point. Instead NATO
concentrated on showing a united face but this did not
disguise the lack of strategy. In one of the frequent
NATO press briefings, Air Commodore Wilby stated
that “There never has been a timeline to this operation,
and I think that it has been one of those campaigns that
has been a very dynamic campaign.”7013 Eipascope 99/2
If assessed on the political goals established by
NATO itself – which were firstly, to stop the killing in
Kosovo and the brutal destruction of human lives and
properties; second, to put an end to the appalling
humanitarian situation unfolding in Kosovo and to
create conditions for the refugees to be able to return;
and third, to create the conditions for a political solution
to the crisis based on the Rambouillet agreement – the
performance of the Alliance has thus far been sorely
lacking.71 NATO did not stop the killing in Kosvo (a
report by Médecins Sans Frontières estimated that 13
percent of the 15-55 year old Albanian Kosovars are
missing based on a detailed study of the refugees from
Roseje)72 nor did it stop the destruction of properties.
The lack of ground intervention meant that NATO
could not address the appalling humanitarian situation
in Kosovo until the refugees fled to surrounding countries
and, even then, this proved problematic for the
international agencies involved. Whether anyone or
anything can create the conditions for the return of
around one million refugees remains to be seen.
On the occasion of his retirement as Chairman of
NATO’s Military Committee on 5 May 1999, General
Klaus Naumann looked back on over forty days of air
strikes and concluded that, “Quite frankly and honestly
we did not succeed in our initial attempt to coerce
Miloševic ´ through airstrikes to accept our demands, nor
did we succeed in preventing the FRY pursuing a
campaign of ethnic separation and expression.”73 The
excessive faith in what air strikes can achieve and open
disagreements on the wisdom of deploying forces on the
ground in Kosovo may provoke a critical look at NATO
and the security and defence requirements of its member
states.
It would though be premature to label NATO as a
failure. It is nevertheless a bruised and battered
organisation whose member’s ability and will to address
the intricacies of intra-state conflict management has to
be challenged. Kosovo should also prompt a long hard
look within the EU at the wisdom of continued reliance
upon the US. The lessons arising from Kosovo for
NATO may well emphasise those areas where CFSP
could perhaps offer a more coherent and constructive
role. For instance, the effects of Kosovo may illustrate
the need for greater attention to conflict prevention and
to the need construct a common defence and security
policy upon a sound common foreign policy. Such a
common foreign policy should recognise that in most
instances the EU and the US will share common interests
but this should not imply an obligation for the US to lead
or for the European allies to follow.
Conclusions
The results of the crisis in Kosvo will mark a turning
point for CFSP. It cannot stay static since this would
condemn it to virtual irrelevance. The crisis could
therefore prompt the EU member states to build an
effective and autonomous security and defence capability
based on the humiliation of Kosovo and the enormous
costs associated with the resettlement or absorption of
refugees and reconstruction in Yugoslavia, not to
mention a multi-year post-conflict military presence.
Or, an admittedly more fashionable view is that the
convenient myth of European security, built around
ineffective European paper structures and a reduced but
still hegemonic US role, will prevail.
Muddling through, of the type that prevailed in the
Gulf War of 1990-91, Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo, is
unacceptable for a number of reasons. First, the
uncoordinated and ad hoc responses to successive post-
cold war crises in Europe demonstrate the limits of
reliance upon coalitions of the willing. It is clear as a
result of Kosovo that not only must the regional
organisations be given a clear mandate backed by the
political will of the organisations” members, but that
regional consensus must be backed by clear mandates
under public international law. Second, reliance upon
ad hoc arrangements inevitably puts the emphasis upon
conflict management whereby addressing the crisis
often only happens at a very late stage and normally
only after armed conflict is well established. Conflict
prevention, linked a range of economic, political and
military options, is a far more purposive and humane
way to address intra-state crises. Third, reliance upon
American military muscle and superiority also implies
reliance upon US diplomacy and goals when the long-
term effects of US-baked intervention have yet to prove
any tangible benefits to European or international
security (with the sole possible exception of Bosnia). It
is equally presumptive on the part of the European allies
to assume that the US will be there to indefinitely bale
out its allies.
If there is a positive outcome from the Kosovo
catastrophe it will be that, out of humiliation and perhaps
even some guilt, the EU is forced to make a real
commitment to the security and defence of the member
states and their neighbours. Romano Prodi would appear
to be pushing the EU firmly in this direction. Although
it will be an uphill struggle that will involve genuine
political commitment and considerable resources, the
emphasis should be upon the construction of a credible
EU conflict prevention capability. This not only plays to
the strengths of the EU but allows the full range of
preventative measures to be employed, of which the use
of force is the last. NATO tends to be more useful for
crisis management.
It is all too easy to see Kosovo as the latest in a line
of dismal attempts to co-ordinate EU positions on
questions of security and defence. It is also tempting to
conclude that the CFSP cannot overcome the
contradictory stances of its fifteen members. The same
was thought at one time of progress towards monetary
union. The tragedy of Kosovo is that the common
denominator that should have appealed to all EU
members alike was the need to immediately alleviate
humanitarian suffering at the expense of national
positions. The utility of the CFSP has therefore to be
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with a tool to uphold the values and objectives contained
in the Amsterdam Treaty’s provisions on a CFSP. No
amount of institutional modification or any number of
intergovernmental conferences will help if these
underlying values and objectives are not shared. Kosovo
will serve as a reminder of what they are. As the EU
faces the costs of assimilating or repatriating refugees,
those of reconstruction in Yugoslavia, and policing any
eventual settlement, the economic and political costs of
creating a genuine CFSP may seem rather affordable.
RÉSUMÉ
Bien qu’il semble qu’il faille attendre encore longtemps
pour ressentir les pleins effets de l’imbroglio qui se
déroule au Kosovo et même si le Traité d’Admsterdam
vient à peine d’entrer en vigueur, il est cependant
nécessaire de se concentrer sur la contribution que les
dispositions du traité pourraient apporter à l’UE et à
d’autres organisations associées pour faire face de
manière appropriée à de futures crises.
Les domaines dans lesquels les dispositions du Traité
d’Amsterdam risquent de s’avérer inadéquates – et il
semble qu’ils soient nombreux – suggèrent aussi le
besoin d’aller plus loin que les structures de sécurité en
Europe qui sont pour le moment largement confinées à
de simples documents. Le Kosovo produira l’un des
deux effets suivants: soit il va rajeunir la Politique
étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) et conférer
un effet pratique à une politique de défense commune et
à une défense commune, soit il laissera la sécurité de la
région largement entre les mains des USA, avec tous les
avantages et les risques que cela comporte.
La première option impliquera un changement de
l’approche de la PESC et une volonté d’investir dans un
dispositif militaire approprié, qui permette de s’attaquer
aux causes et aux effets de conflits de nature
essentiellement interétatique. La deuxième option, quant
à elle, poursuivra les modèles établis durant la guerre
froide, dans lesquels les Européens (occidentaux)
dépendent largement des USA pour l’initiative, le
leadership et l’armement. Le Kosovo marque un
tournant, dans la mesure où ses effets peuvent contribuer
à faire de la PESC une réalité ou risquent de la faire
capoter définitivement.
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